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THE MACBRIDE REPORT IN TWENTY-
FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALISM, THE AGEOF
SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE BRICS
COUNTRIES
Christian Fuchs
The MacBride Report was published in 1980. The report communicated the need for a New
World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). With the breakdown of what used
to be called “actually existing socialism“ in the East and with the rise of the neoliberal com-
modiﬁcation of everything, a NWICO indeed emerged, but one that looked quite different
from that the MacBride commission imagined. Thirty-ﬁve years later, it is time to ask how
the situation of the media and communications in society has changed. This contribution
asks the question of what we can make of the MacBride Report today in a media world
and society that has seen the rise of an economically driven form of globalisation that
also has impacts on the media, the expansion of the information economy with a new
young precariat at its core, and the emergence of the World Wide Web and its change
into a highly commercialised system, including the emergence of so-called “social media“
whose capital accumulation model is based on targeted advertising.
KEYWORDS NWICO; MacBride Report; Internet; social media; information capitalism; global
capitalism; political economy of global communication
Introduction
The MacBride Report was published in 1980. The report communicated the need for a
New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) and reported the results of the
UNESCO’s International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems that was set
up in 1977 and chaired by the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize winner Seán MacBride (for a detailed
discussion of the context see Nordenstreng 2015). With the breakdown of what used to be
called “actually existing socialism“ in the East and with the rise of the neoliberal commodi-
ﬁcation of everything, a NWICO indeed emerged, but one that looked quite different from
that the MacBride Commission imagined. Thirty-ﬁve years later, it is time to ask how the
situation of the media and communications in society has changed.
The USA and the United Kingdom tended to see the MacBride Report as a southern
and eastern communist attack on freedom (of private property and advertising) and an
embracement of communism. They left UNESCO which had commissioned and published
the Report, which according to Nordenstreng (2015, 78) was also connected to the USA’s
turn from multilateralism to unilateralism under Reagan. The US State Department said in
December 1983, when it announced that the USA would depart from UNESCO: “Unesco
has extraneously politicized virtually every subject it deals with, has exhibited hostility
toward the basic institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press,
and has demonstrated unrestrained budgetary expansion”.1 The US Assistant Secretary of
State for International Organization Affairs Gregory J. Newell argued: “Unesco policies, for
several years, have served anti-U.S. political ends”.2 The New York Times reported:
The Washington-based Heritage Foundation has been attacking the organization for about
two years in reports and statements contending that the United Nations had turned into a
largely anti-American club dominated by the Soviet bloc, by European leftists, and by
radical countries in the third world.3
The United Kingdomonly rejoined UNESCO in 1997 and the USA in 2003. The US andUK
retreat also resulted in the departure of UNESCO’s Director General Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow:
NWICO was attacked as a curb on media freedom, whereas in reality the concept was
designed to widen and deepen the freedom of information by increasing its balance and
diversity on aglobal scale. For its initiators, NWICOwas an idealistic instrument of diplomacy,
and Third World dictators did not need it as an excuse for suppressing media. The anti-
NWICO campaign was an ideologically apologetic exercise by private media proprietors,
and it became effective only because of the extraordinary power with which it was
waged. In this sense it is justiﬁed to call the campaign a “Big Lie”. (Nordenstreng 2013, 350)
Struck monetarily by the US and UK departures, UNESCO as a consequence “not only aban-
doned the strategic direction of the South and the East; it did its utmost to appeal to the
West“ (Mansell and Nordenstreng 2005, 23–24). The Report was criticised as eclectic,
giving in too much to liberal ideology, and neglecting how media and communications
are embedded into societal totality and underestimating the role of transnational corpor-
ations (Hamelink 1980).
In 2005, 25 years after the publication of the MacBride Report, there were debates
about its legacy. Daya Thussu argued that the Commission’s concerns remained true,
especially because in a digital world the “biggest beneﬁciaries of the processes of liberalisa-
tion, deregulation and privatisation and the resultant WTO agreements, have been the
transnational corporations (TNCs) which dominate global trade”, such as in the media
world Disney, Time Warner and News Corporation (2005, 54). “Murdochisation is the ideo-
logical shift in media culture from public service to proﬁt-oriented programming. [… ] As
Murdoch triumphs in this marketisation of media systems internationally, MacBride must
be turning in his grave“ (Thussu 2005, 57 and 59).
Kaarle Nordenstreng (2005, 59) argued that the “MacBride Report was indeed rela-
tively lightweight”, but “carried quite a lot of political weight and came to signify the
global movement towards democracy and equity in communication spurred on by the
decolonisation offensive of the early 1970s”. Armand Mattelart said that:
its greatest merit is the fact that it existed. It was the ﬁrst time a document legitimised by a
UN institution conferred viability on structural imbalances in the ﬁeld of communications
while also proposing a number of clues for solving them. (2005, 53)
Andrew Calabrese wrote that the “Report projects a spirit of hopefulness about how a better
world is possible“ (2005, 25).
Computing and the Internet
Thirty-ﬁve years after the publication of the MacBride Report there is much talk about
social media, which is an impact of the combination of computing, globalisation as well as
social and technological networking, and an expression of the development of the means of
communication that have become immediate productive forces. In 1980 computers were
still predominantly used in ofﬁces and had not entered households to a signiﬁcant
degree. Home computers such as the IBM PC, the Macintosh (Apple Inc.), the ZX (Sinclair
Research Ltd), the Commodore 64 (Commodore International Ltd) or the Amiga 1000 (Com-
modore International Ltd) were introduced in the early 1980s.
The MacBride Report argues that a:
new era of communication is opening up. It is now conceivable that a worldwide com-
munication system could be built that would link any point of the planet with any
other. Conversely, it is also possible to envisage a web of networks that would integrate
autonomous or semi-autonomous decentralized units. (MacBride Commission [1980]
1984, 32)
In 1980, the Internet was still the ARPANET, the number of hosts was limited to around 1004
and the TCP/IP protocol was not yet used. The World Wide Web (WWW) did not exist for
another nine years. The Internet’s scope was therefore still very limited. What the MacBride
Commission describes as a web of networks is a good description of the technological struc-
ture of the Internet and the WWW. The Commission, however, warns about the threat that
technological advances “are the privilege of a handful of countries“ ([1980] 1984, 32).
Information and Communication Inequalities in the Global and Digital Age
A major concern of the MacBride Report is the existence of unequal access to and
beneﬁts from information and communication, a situation to which it has reacted by
demanding a human right to communication (MacBride Commission [1980] 1984, 147–
148 and 215–216).
Limits to freedom and equality in the context of communications that the MacBride
Commission discusses and criticises include the political and commercial censorship of
information, media concentration caused by commercial or political media monopolies,
top-down elite communication that excludes ordinary citizens, the lack of the publication
of a diversity of sources, content and opinions; cultural domination on a world scale that
is driven by big international media and can result in parochialism and cultural stagnation,
the ignorance or distorted representation of developing countries in the news media, devel-
oping countries’ unequal access to telecommunications networks, the postal system, book
publishing, libraries, news agencies, newspapers, television sets, informatics and computers;
and the power of the advertising industry, repression against journalists, unbalanced one-
way information ﬂow from elites to the public and developed countries to developing
countries, stereotyped and distorted news, cultural homogenisation and lack of media
attention to disadvantaged groups.
The MacBride Commission made 82 recommendations aimed at “eliminating imbal-
ances and disparities in communication and its structures, and particularly in information
ﬂows“ ([1980] 1984, 192). They aimed at strengthening an alternative, public, commons-
based, local and decentralised organisation of the media. The Commission envisioned a
NWICO that is based on “international assistance and contributions towards international
understanding“ ([1980] 1984, 220), “co-operation on a worldwide scale“ (220), “open
relations of interdependence and complementarity, based on mutual interest and the
equal dignity of nations and peoples“ (221) and “more free, more equal, more just relations
within all societies and among all nations and peoples“ (233).
Media and cultural development since the time the MacBride Report was published
has shown that capitalism does not necessarily result in a cultural homogenisation that uni-
formises habits, tastes, preferences and opinions (as argued in MacBride Commission [1980]
1984, 128–129). Bollywood, Nollywood, Japanese video games, Brazilian and Mexican tele-
novelas, news provided by Al-Jazeera, the BBC, CCTV and Russia Today, and so forth, show
that cultural globalisation is not automatically Americanisation, McDonaldisation, Disneyﬁ-
cation and Murdochisation understood as western or US capitalist control. The existence of
capitalism is perfectly compatible with a diversity of tastes and does not necessarily have
uniformising effects. The problem is rather that the capitalist model of organising the
media and culture is globally dominant and that the neoliberalisation and entrepreneuria-
lisation of everything5 makes the survival of publicly or commonly controlled media that
disseminate public service content (Williams [1974] 1990, 83–84) difﬁcult.
The sociologist Vivek Chibber argues in this context in his book Postcolonial Theory
and the Specter of Capital:
[As] capitalism spreads across the globe, it does not inevitably turn every culture into a
replica of what has been observed in the West. The universalization of capital is perfectly
compatible with the persistence of social, cultural, and political differentiation between
East and West. Capital does not have to obliterate social difference in order to universalize
itself. It merely has to subordinate those dimensions of social reproduction that are essen-
tial to its own functioning. These dimensions are the ones directly involved in the pro-
duction and distribution of use-values. [… ] Capitalism can sustain a broad gamut of
power relations and social identities. (Chibber 2013, 150–151)
The plurality of identities and cultural contents helps to universalise the commodity form:
for everyone, there is a speciﬁc, ﬂexibly specialised commodity. The point is that through
diversiﬁcation of its content, the commodity form becomes universalised. The media/
culture/digital/creative industries are in fact not industries in the plural, but a culture indus-
try that through diversity creates capitalist uniformity.
One should also look at the distribution of power between media ﬂows and contra-
ﬂows. The “revenues of non-Westernmedia organizations,with the exception of Japanese ani-
mation, are relatively small and their global impact is restricted to geo-cultural markets or at
best to small pockets of regional transnational consumers“ (Thussu [2006] 2010, 234). India is
the second largest exporter of computer services and China is the largest exporter of
assembled mobile phones and computers, whereas no developing or emerging economy is
among the largest exporters of newspapers, journals, periodicals and audio-visual content
(data source: Trade Map—International Trade Statistics, data for 2012, http://www.
trademap.org). India andChina are sources for cheap labour that produces andassembles soft-
ware and hardware. They are to a much lesser extent the source of globally inﬂuential ideas,
news and cultural products. In 2012 the USA controlled 48.1 per cent of the largest exporters’
volume of audio-visual content, and the EU27 countries 39.8 per cent. Russia accounted for
1.3 per cent, Argentina for 1.2 per cent, China (including Hong Kong) for 0.8 per cent and
South Korea for 0.7 per cent (data source: WTO International Trade Statistics 2012, table
III.40). We are today confronted with the globalisation of the capitalist model, proﬁt-making,
capital accumulation, privatisation of communications and other services, inequality, advertis-
ing, cultural sponsorship, public relations and consumerism (Schiller [1991] 2010).
Is there communication and information inequality in the online realm? Digital
inequality involves unequal access to digital media technologies, the unequal distribution
of digital skills, usage capacities and the motivation to use digital media, as well as
unequal beneﬁts from using them. Although Internet access in the developing countries
has increased from 2.1 per cent of the population in 2000 to 27.3 per cent in 2012 and
from 0.5 to 14.8 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa (data source: Millennium Development
Goals 2014, statistical annex), many challenges lie ahead. The physical access gap is far
from closed and digital inequality extends to many other levels of access. Digital media
evolve and new technologies and potentials rapidly emerge. Given socio-economic, politi-
cal and cultural–educational inequalities in the world, young, urban, educated and relatively
wealthy users are those that beneﬁt ﬁrst and most, whereas others are excluded and have to
catch up. As long as capitalism exists, there will be various inequalities in the world that
reproduce themselves in complex manners in the digital realm and communications in
general. Seven for-proﬁt telecommunications companies are among the world’s 100
largest companies (data source: Forbes 2000, 2014 list, http://www.forbes.com), which is
an indication that access to communications is largely a capitalist business designed to
cost money for all that results in proﬁts for the few. There are alternatives, such as local
cost-free wireless community networks, that can challenge capitalist communications.
Such alternatives that in a practical manner stand in the tradition of the MacBride
report’s goals, however, have not proliferated to a signiﬁcant degree and therefore
remain a mere potential for public Internet access.
The BRICS Countries and the Information Economy
What does economic development look like in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia,
India, China, South Africa) that are sometimes said to have the potential to create a multi-
lateral world? The BRICS countries’ share of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP)
increased from 8.7 per cent in 2000 to 20.6 per cent in 2012, whereas that of the USA
decreased from 31.2 to 22.3 per cent and that of the EU28 countries from 25.8 to 22.8
per cent (data source: World Development Indicators, GDP in US$, http://data.worldbank.
org/data-catalog/world-developmentindicators). China’s share increased from 3.6 to
11.3 per cent. According to other statistics that use real GDP data, in 2014 the USA
accounted for 16.4 per cent of the world’s GDP and China for 15.8 per cent (data source:
IMF World Economic Outlook 2014, October, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/
2014/02/). According to projections, China will in 2018 account for 17.9 per cent of the
world’s GDP, the USA for 18.6 per cent, the European Union and the USA together for
34.6 per cent and the BRICS countries together for 30.7 per cent (data source: IMF World
Economic Outlook 2013, October, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/
weodata/index.aspx). Given these data, one should bear in mind that China’s total GDP
size has to do with its immense population: in 2013, China’s 1.36 billion inhabitants
accounted for 19.1 per cent of the world population, whereas the USA’s 316 million
made up a share of 4.4 per cent (data source: World Development Indicators, population).
In terms of the GDP per capita there is a quite signiﬁcant difference: in 2013, it was US
$53,143 in the USA and US$11,904 in China (data source: World Development Indicators,
GDP per capita PPP, in current international US$).
Given the BRICS countries’ signiﬁcant share of the world’s GDP, population share,
share of media users and consumers, and increasing shares of foreign direct investment
ﬂows and the share of the world’s largest transnational corporations, Daya Thussu and
Kaarle Nordenstreng (2015, 13) ask whether “these new global players“ are “necessarily
opposed to the US–UK hegemony” or whether they are “following the same market-
driven, infotainment-oriented model”. There is no doubt that the BRICS countries’ econom-
ies, politics and media have complicated “the discourse about international media“ (2015,
131). Given the BRICS countries’ share of the world’s Internet users, Daya Thussu asks:
[W]ill this critical mass contribute to strengthening the voice of the South on the global
scene or will they act as surrogates to the US-dominated entertainment-driven media?
[… ] Will a NWICO 2.0, fuelled by rising powers like BRICS, reconﬁgure the global com-
munication discourse? (2015, 258–259)
Table 1, based on the Forbes 2000 list of the world’s 2000 largest transnational com-
panies, presents data for information companies in the USA and the BRICS countries. Infor-
mation companies are located in the following economic sectors: advertising, broadcasting
and cable, communications equipment, computer and electronics retail, computer hard-
ware, computer services, computer storage devices, consumer electronics, electronics, Inter-
net and catalogue retail, printing and publishing, semiconductors, software and
programming, and telecommunications services.
The USA dominates the global information economy’s market value, sales, proﬁts and
capital assets. The volume of the US information economy’s power is between 3.4 and 5.4
times as large as the combined volume of the BRICS countries’ information sectors. Even if
China and the BRICS’ countries further rise economically, then such a change does not auto-
matically mean big changes in the world information system: given that all of the BRICS
countries are capitalist societies, their economic development aims at increasing proﬁts
and so their economic advancement ﬁrst and foremost means a shift in the geo-political
distribution of capitalist proﬁt. If one sees capital on a whole as a global capitalist, then
the crucial question is how its relationship to the global working class looks. One therefore
needs to also look at the share of the global worker in global wealth. If advancement of the
BRICS economies and their information sectors merely means increased proﬁts, but lower
shares of the working class in total wealth, then the assumed emerging geo-political multi-
lateralism is in fact nothing but global capitalist unilateralism.
TABLE 1
Financial shares of information companies that are located in speciﬁc countries, from Forbes











USA 32.4 52.3 36.1 51.4 38.9
China and
Hong Kong
5.1 6.2 5.4 8.0 5.9
India 2.0 2.0 0.8 1.6 0.8
Russia 1.2 0.5 1.0 0.7 1.0
South Africa 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.4
Brazil 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.5
BRICS 9.5 9.7 7.8 11.2 8.6
Data source: Forbes 2000, 2013 list.
In the period from 1990 to 2009, the share of labour compensation in the GDP (the so-
called labour share) declined in 26 of 30 OECD countries (ILO 2012, 42). The median labour
share in these countries decreased from 66.1 to 61.7 per cent during this time period (2012,
42). There were also declines of the labour share in Asia, North Africa, and Latin America. In a
combination of 16 developed countries, the decline of the average labour share was from
around 75 per cent in the mid-1970s to about 65 per cent before the crisis started. In a com-
bination of 16 developing and emerging economies, the decrease was from 62 per cent in
the early 1990s to 58 per cent before the crisis (2012, 42). Wages have risen much slower
than productivity, which has resulted in a growth of the capital share at the expense of
the labour share (2012, 44–48). The data in Figure 1 show that in China the labour share
decreased from around 65 per cent in the early 1990s to slightly above 45 per cent in
2011 (ILO 2015, 27). The data for India in Figure 2 show that the labour share decreased
from around 20 per cent in the early 1990s to around 10 per cent in the late 2000s,
whereas the proﬁt share (the share of proﬁts in the GDP) increased from around 30 to
55 per cent (ILO 2010, 91).
China’s Gini coefﬁcient (a measure of inequality ranging from zero, which represents
perfect equality, to one, perfect inequality) rose from about 0.3 in the early 1980s to
more than 0.45 in the early 2000s. After 2000, the Gini rose further to a high of 0.49 in
2008. Since then it has declined slightly, but remains well above 0.45. With a Gini
approaching 0.5, China’s level of income inequality is in the same ballpark as that of rela-
tively high-inequality Latin American countries such as Mexico (0.51), Nicaragua (0.52), and
Peru (0.48), although still lower than Brazil and Honduras (0.56–0.57). China is now among
the least equal 25 percent of countries worldwide. Very few Asian countries belong to this
group. (Sicular 2013, 1)
FIGURE 1
Development of the labour share in China (source: ILO 2015, 27).
Note: Reproduction of ILO material is authorised without written permission for up to
two tables/ﬁgures, see: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/disclaim/discrcit.htm
China’s rising inequality has to do with the fast growth of the wealth of the rich, urban–rural
differences and the dominant class’ income from private property (Sicular 2013, 1). Income
inequality measured by the Gini index increased in India from a level of 32 per cent in the
early 1990s to 38 per cent in 2011.6 The top 10 per cent have incomes 12 times as large as
those of the bottom 10 per cent, which is a doubling since the early 1990s.7 The cases of
India and China show that rising overall economic growth does not automatically mean
an increase of wage and income equality. In both countries the opposite has been the case.
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) created a model that analyses the development of
the labour share in 59 (developing and developed) countries from 1975 until 2012:
We start by documenting a 5 percentage point decline in the share of global corporate
gross value added paid to labor over the last 35 years. [… ] Of the 59 countries with at
least 15 years of data between 1975 and 2012, 42 exhibited downward trends in their
labor shares. (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2013, 1)
The empirical data also show large labour share declines in China and India.
Marta Guerriero (2012) collected and analysed labour share data for the time period
1970–2009. Her samples consisted of 89 countries. The dataset included 33 African, 29
American, 32 Asian, 38 European and nine Oceanian countries. Her conclusion is that the
labour share has been “generally declining over time“ (2012, 21). The data show a
modest increase of the average labour share in Brazil from the 1990s to the 2000s, a ﬂuc-
tuation in Russia with an overall drop from the 1970s to 2000s, and a relatively constant
share since the 1970s in South Africa with slight increases. Alternative studies indicate a
constant decline of the labour share in Brazil during the past decades and in the long
FIGURE 2
Development of the labour and proﬁt shares in India (source: ILO 2010, 91).
Note: Reproduction of ILO material is authorised without written permission for up to
two tables/ﬁgures, see: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/disclaim/discrcit.htm
term (Frankema 2010). According to other estimations the ofﬁcial wage share was at the
same level of around 40 per cent in 2012 as in 1995 (ILO 2015, 17). The ILO has calculated
that since 2000 the labour share has decreased in South Africa (2015, 17). Guerriero’s (2012)
data show a sharp drop of the labour share in China and India. Given China and India’s huge
share of the BRICS countries’ population and GDP, it becomes evident that the labour share
taken as a whole must have exhibited a quite sharp drop in the BRICS area since the 1970s.
China and India have been among the countries with the highest GDP growth rates in
the world. The GDP is a deceptive macroeconomic variable, however, because it mixes
together proﬁts and wages. A class analysis requires one to disentangle these components
and to have a look at the global relationship between capital and labour. The data pre-
sented in this paper show that in recent decades capital has expanded its power at the
expense of labour through neoliberal class struggle, and that this development has in
the BRICS countries especially taken place in China and India so that economic growth
and productivity have in relative terms predominantly beneﬁtted the capitalist class. One
should in this context bear in mind that the decisive criterion for analysing the deepening
or reduction of capitalist class domination is the relative share in the total economy.
Is BRICS a Brick against Capitalist Advertising Culture in the Age of Social
Media?
In 2014, there were about three billion Internet users in the world (42.3 per cent of the
world population). China accounted for 21.2 per cent of them, India for 8.0 per cent, Brazil
for 3.6 per cent, Russia for 2.9 per cent and South Africa for 0.8 per cent.8 The BRICS
countries therefore together accounted for 36.4 per cent. The USA’s share was 9.1 per
cent and that of the European Union 13.1 per cent. Does the BRICS countries’ large quantity
of users translate into an Internet that is qualitatively different from the western one in a
positive sense?
Table 2 presents an overview of the most accessed websites in the BRICS countries.
Google (including subsidiaries such as YouTube and Blogspot) is dominant in Brazil, India
and South Africa, and plays an important role in Russia. Other US companies relevant in
these countries are Yahoo, Microsoft (live.com), Linkedin and Amazon. In addition, there
are platforms that are of particular national or regional importance. In Brazil, Uol is an
TABLE 2
Most accessed websites in the BRICS countries
Brazil Russia India China South Africa
1 Google.com.br Yandex Google.co.in Baidu Google.co.za
2 Facebook Vk Google.com Taobao Google.com
3 Google.com Google.ru Facebook Qq Facebook
4 YouTube Google.com YouTube Sina YouTube
5 Uol Mail.ru Yahoo Tmall Yahoo
6 Globo YouTube Flipkart Weibo Amazon
7 Yahoo Odnoklassniki Wikipedia Hao123 Gumtree.co.za
8 Live Facebook Blogspot.in Sohu Wikipedia
9 Mercadolivre Wikipedia Linkedin 360.cn Linkedin
10 Aliexpress Avito Indiatimes 163.com Twitter
Data source: http://www.alexa.com (accessed December 1, 2014).
advertising-based online portal that is part of the Brazilian media conglomerate Grupo
Folha. Globo.com is an advertising-ﬁnanced online portal owned by Roberto Marinho’s
media conglomerate Grupo Globo. Mercadolivre is an online shop making proﬁt by
selling goods online; eBay owns around 20 per cent of it. Aliexpress is an online shop
owned by the Chinese Alibaba Group.
In Russia, Russian companies operate Yandex, Vk, Mail.ru, Odnoklassniki and Avito.
Yandex is an advertising-based search engine. The Mail.ru Group owns the social networks
Vk and Odnoklassniki and the online platform Mail.ru. Its capital accumulation model is tar-
geted online advertising. Avito is a classiﬁed online advert service owned by the Avito
Holding. It uses a freemium model that accumulates capital by selling premium advert
services.
The India Times is an online portal operated by the Times Group, India’s largest media
group. This portal uses advertising and the sales of goods in online shops as its business
model. Flipkart is an Indian online shop that sells goods. In South Africa, Gumtree that is
owned by the Californian company eBay Inc. is popular. This is a classiﬁed advert service
that makes use of a freemium model to attract users and accumulates capital by selling
premium adverts.
Private companies such as Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Sina and Sohu operate China’s
most accessed WWW platforms. Western platforms are kept out by censorship and
control, which reﬂects capitalism with Chinese characteristics: China’s model is an author-
itarian form of capitalism, in which private enterprise that dominates the WWW is combined
with strong forms of state control. Chinese WWW platforms’ capital accumulation models
and platforms are not so different from western ones. Baidu Inc. owns the search engine
Baidu and the online portal Hao123. It uses targeted advertising as its main proﬁt strategy.
The Alibaba Group operates the online shops Taobao and Tmall and accumulates capital by
selling goods online. Tencent Holdings Ltd owns the online platform and instant messenger
Qq. It sells adverts and memberships. Sina Corp. possesses the online portal Sina and the
microblog Weibo. Its business model uses advertising and premium memberships. Sohu
Inc. uses the same strategy for its search engine and online portal Sohu. Qihoo360 Ltd
owns 360.cn, a platform that distributes antivirus software and uses a freemiummodel com-
bined with online advertising. NetEase Inc. operates the online portal 163.com that makes
proﬁt from online games and advertising.
If one looks at the dominant WWW platforms in the BRICS countries as a whole,
then it becomes evident that, just as in the West, commercial logic rules: for-proﬁt com-
panies dominate, targeted online advertising is the main capital accumulation strategy,
online shops and online advert services are popular, freemium services are combined
with advertising. In Russia and China, national capitals play an important role in the
WWW. In Brazil and India, large national capitalist media companies (Folha, Globo,
Times Group) are relevant. In the BRICS countries just like in the West, the WWW is pre-
dominantly a sphere of commerce and capital accumulation, a large shopping mall and
advertising billboard.
The MacBride report warned about the dangers of advertising and argued for de-
commercialising the media:
. A “balanced debate in advertising is a contradiction in terms. As advertising is designed
to sell godos and services, it tends to promote attitudes and life-styles that extol acqui-
sitions and consumption at the expense of other values. [… ] Consequently many
developing countries see advertising as a threat to their cultural identity, since it brings
in its wake alien ethical values and may deviate consumer demands to non-priority
areas. Moreover, the threat to withdraw advertising can jeopardize press freedom“
(MacBride Commission [1980] 1984, 102–103).
. “Even if advertisers do not actually attempt to inﬂuence editorial policy, there are often
cases where fear of losing a big client can lead editors and journalists to avoid the
subject altogether or to tone down their criticism considerably“ ([1980] 1984, 109).
. Advertising’s “most virulent critics claim that it is primarily concerned with exalting
materialistic needs by exploiting hidden anxieties, by doing away with objective argu-
ments and by using manipulative techniques which, they say, turn men, women and
children into passive, irrational consumer. Though such accusations are grossly over-
stated, they cannot be brushed aside entirely“ ([1980] 1984, 123).
Given such criticism, one dimension of the MacBride Commission’s recommendations
focused on reducing the commercialisation of communications:
The social effects of the commercialization of the mass media are a major concern in policy
formulation and decision-making by private and public bodies. [… ] In expanding com-
munication systems, preference should be given to non-commercial forms of mass com-
munication. [… ] As in the ﬁeld of education, public funds might be made available for
this purpose. ([1980] 1984, 205)
Advertising and commercial logic dominate the WWW. So, quite contrary to the warn-
ings of the MacBride Commission, advertising culture has been further extended and has
colonised new realms of communication. The Commission’s warnings remain highly
topical, however, although one should add that one of the important political–economic
problems of advertising is the exploitation of users and audiences’ digital and consumer
labour (Smythe 1977; Fuchs 2014a, 2014b, 2015).
Conclusion
Wikipedia is the only non-proﬁt civil society platform that achieves large-scale popu-
larity both in and outside the western WWW. It is in contrast to commercial platforms in line
with Tim Berners-Lee’s original idea of the WWW because it fosters digital commons.
Berners-Lee did not envision the WWW for making money, but as a common good for con-
necting humanity. He therefore released it as open good to the world. Wikipedia’s aim is to
provide encyclopaedic knowledge about the world that has been co-created by volunteers.
It is a non-proﬁt project that is advertising free. It is based on volunteers’ ideational contri-
butions and monetary donations. Wikipedia is a commons-based knowledge and peer pro-
duction project. It did not originate in developing or emerging economies, but in capitalist
America, which shows that neoliberalism is not able to completely destroy and colonise
humans’ desire to collaborate, share and engage with each other outside of exchange
and monetary relations. Wikipedia is the world’s seventh most used web platform.9
Civil society projects such as Wikipedia, WikiLeaks, Sacom, China Labor Watch, Red
China, Alternet, DemocracyNow!, Citizen Matters (India), India Together, Mídia NINJA
(Brazil), mst.org.br (Movimento dos trabalhadores rurais sem terra, Brazil), Mediazona
(Russia), Abahlali baseMjondolo (South Africa), Amandla! (South Africa), AfricaFiles, and so
forth, aim at fostering the logic of the commons in society and make use of the Internet
for this purpose. They are expressions of the essential human qualities of sharing, solidarity
and mutual aid. They reﬂect the MacBride Report’s stress that communication is a founda-
tional human need, whereas capital accumulation is an alienation of human needs: access
to communication is “a fundamental human right”, whereas “the freedom of an investors to
make a proﬁt from the media“ permits in contrast “the commercialization of a social need“
(MacBride Commission [1980] 1984, 39).
In the age of social media, media are predominantly unsocial, namely shaped by
capitalism’s individualistic consumption and accumulation logic. At the same time, the
Internet fosters new potentials for the commons, non-monetary social relations, gifting
and sharing that transcend capitalism. We need now, just like ever before, truly social
media—namely the “decentralization and democratization of production and distribution
in the sphere of social communication“ (MacBride Commission [1980] 1984, 54).
China and India have been among the countries with the highest GDP growth rates in
the world during the past couple of years. This development has included the expansion of
the power of capital and the disempowerment of labour in China and India, which means a
deepening of capitalist class power. The BRICS countries’ increasing shares of economic
power and the information sector are meaningless as long as they predominantly result
in a growth of the capital and proﬁt shares and a reduction of the labour share. They are
at the moment only an expression of global inter-capitalist geo-political and geo-economic
rivalries. At the same time the development of the BRICS economies shows the relevance of
what Marx (1867) termed the contradiction between productive forces and capitalist class
relations of production: the capitalist development of the productive forces grows the
overall wealth and socialises the means of production, but given capitalist social relations
at the same time relatively deepens exploitation, capitalist class power and inequality.
The decisive question is whether the global working class can strengthen its power.
If the working class in the BRICS countries, especially in China and India, can expand
its power, weaken neoliberal and authoritarian capitalism and eventually implement a truly
democratic-socialist system, then BRICS power can be a brick in the wall against global
capitalism. Class struggles in these countries and the world at large are therefore decisive
factors in determining whether an alternative world economic order and an alternative
world information and communication order will be possible. Increasing shares of the
BRICS’ countries in information ﬂows and the information economy alone are not
enough because increasing quantities do not automatically mean a different quality. The
future of the information society does not depend on quantitative demographic and
geo-political shifts, but on the question of whether the global working class in the BRICS
countries and beyond can make a difference and transcend capitalism or not.
NOTES
1. “U.S. is Quitting Unesco, Afﬁrms Backing for U.N.” The New York Times, December 30, 1983.
2. Ibid.
3. “The U.N. versus the U.S.” The New York Times, January 22, 1984.
4. See: http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/ (accessed November 30, 2014).
5. Everything can be commercialised, commodiﬁed, privatised, but in reality this process is




8. Data source: http://www.internetworldstats.com (accessed December 1, 2014)
9. Data source: http://www.alexa.com (accessed December 2, 2014).
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